Introduction
There has been some recent concern expressed about a lack of clarity around when new message types and codes should be added to ICMP (including ICMPv4 [RFC0792] and ICMPv6 [RFC4443] ). We lay out a policy regarding when (and when not) to move functionality into ICMP.
This document is the result of discussions among ICMP experts within the Operations and Management (OPS) area's IP Diagnostics Technical Interest Group [DIAGNOSTICS] and concerns expressed by the OPS area leadership.
Note that this document does not supercede the "IANA Allocation Guidelines For Values In the Internet Protocol and Related Headers" [RFC2780] , which specifies best practices and processes for the allocation of values in the IANA registries but does not describe the policies to be applied in the standards process.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] .
Acceptable Use Policy
In this document, we describe an acceptable use policy for new ICMP message types and codes, and provide some background about the policy.
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In summary, any future message types added to ICMP should be limited to two broad categories:
1. to inform a datagram's originator that a forwarding plane anomaly has been encountered downstream. The datagram originator must be able to determine whether or not the datagram was discarded by examining the ICMP message.
2. to discover and convey dynamic information about a node (other than information usually carried in routing protocols), to discover and convey network-specific parameters, and to discover on-link routers and hosts.
Normally, ICMP SHOULD NOT be used to implement a general-purpose routing or network management protocol. However, ICMP does have a role to play in conveying dynamic information about a network, which would belong in category 2 above.
Classification of Existing Message Types
This section provides a rough breakdown of existing message types according to the taxonomy described in Section 2 at the time of publication.
IPv4 forwarding plane anomaly reporting: As mentioned in Section 2, using ICMP as a general-purpose routing or network management protocol is not advisable and SHOULD NOT be used that way.
ICMP has a role in the Internet as an integral part of the IP layer; it is not as a routing protocol or as a transport protocol for other layers including routing information. From a more pragmatic perspective, some of the key characteristics of ICMP make it a lessthan-ideal choice for a routing protocol. These key characteristics include that ICMP is frequently filtered, is not authenticated, and is easily spoofed. In addition, specialist hardware processing of ICMP would disrupt the deployment of an ICMP-based routing or management protocol.
A Few Notes on RPL
RPL, the IPv6 routing protocol for low-power and lossy networks (see [RFC6550] ) uses ICMP as a transport. In this regard, it is an exception among the ICMP message types. Note that, although RPL is an IP routing protocol, it is not deployed on the general Internet; it is limited to specific, contained networks.
This should be considered anomalous and is not a model for future ICMP message types. That is, ICMP is not intended as a transport for other protocols and SHOULD NOT be used in that way in future specifications. In particular, while it is adequate to use ICMP as a discovery protocol, it does not extend to full routing capabilities. integral part of IPv6 (see Section 2 of [RFC4443] ). When first defined, ICMP messages were thought of as IP messages that didn't carry any higher-layer data. It could be conjectured that the term "control" was used because ICMP messages were not "data" messages.
The word "control" in the protocol name did not describe ICMP's function (i.e., it did not "control" the Internet); rather, it was used to communicate about the control functions in the Internet. For example, even though ICMP included a redirect message type that affects routing behavior in the context of a LAN segment, it was not and is not used as a generic routing protocol.
Security Considerations
This document describes a high-level policy for adding ICMP types and codes. While special attention must be paid to the security implications of any particular new ICMP type or code, this recommendation presents no new security considerations.
From a security perspective, ICMP plays a part in the Photuris protocol [RFC2521] . But more generally, ICMP is not a secure protocol and does not include features to be used to discover network security parameters or to report on network security anomalies in the forwarding plane.
Additionally, new ICMP functionality (e.g., ICMP extensions, or new ICMP types or codes) needs to consider potential ways that ICMP can be abused (e.g., Smurf IP DoS [CA-1998-01]).
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